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Payments for ecosystem services 
Harmful effects of wind turbines 
Forest landscapes 
Private forest owners 
Landscape value trade 
Willingness to accept compensation 
A B S T R A C T   
Although wind power is regarded as a sustainable way to produce electrical energy, wind turbines may cause 
harmful effects locally. A possible solution is to reduce the effects through forest management practices, for 
example leaving forest stands uncut as landscape shields to hide the turbines and stop them from spoiling the 
scenery. Using data from an online survey of landowners, we investigated whether voluntary mechanisms could 
encourage forest owners to change their forest management practices near wind farms to minimize the harmful 
effects. More precisely, we analyzed forest owners’ willingness to participate in an initiative involving payment 
for ecosystem services called Landscape Value Trade (LVT) and studied the related compensation claims in 
southwestern Finland. We explained willingness to participate and the claims made with the characteristics of 
the landowners or their holding and with attitudinal variables. According to our results, 73.6% of the re-
spondents would possibly or certainly participate in the mechanism. The average annual compensation 
requirement in this study was €298 per hectare. In addition, we found that low dependence on forestry and 
forest-related income tended to increase interest in participation in the LVT initiative and reduce the compen-
sation claims. An important result related to the cost-effective application of the mechanism, is that the more 
interested the respondents were in cooperation with the LVT initiative the less compensation they would claim. 
Thus, the voluntary nature of the LVT initiative simultaneously acted as a cost-reducing element. The results 
could help in detecting some of the key features of the supply side of LVT initiatives.   
1. Introduction 
Compared to the use of fossil and biofuels, wind power is generally 
regarded as a sustainable way to produce electrical energy due to the 
possibility it provides to reduce carbon dioxide emissions into the at-
mosphere and help prevent climate change. Thus, investments in wind 
power are expected to increase in the future (Huttunen, 2017), which 
will lead to wind parks also being located closer to residential buildings 
and villages than currently, where they will be strongly present in the 
visual landscape of local people. 
Although wind power is globally seen as environmentally friendly, 
wind turbines may cause harmful effects on a local level (Groothuis 
et al., 2008). Tall wind turbines near homes, holiday homes, or outdoor 
recreation areas may visually disturb the scenery. The shadows from the 
towers or the shadow flicker of the turbine blades may disturb people. 
The low frequency noise of the rotors may cause stress. In addition, 
people may worry about the effects on their health or that of family 
members (Zerrahn, 2017). Thus, in the building of wind turbines global 
and national environmental benefits come into conflict with some of the 
local environmental drawbacks (Warren et al., 2005). 
Several studies have examined the externalities that wind turbines 
cause on the landscape and biodiversity. Using a data set from a choice 
experiment (CE) survey, Mariel et al. (2015), for example, analyzed the 
preferences of German citizens regarding wind farms and showed how 
preferences differed between inhabitants. Meyerhoff et al. (2010) 
investigated landscape externalities affected by onshore wind power 
with two CE surveys carried out in Westsachsen and Nordhessen, Ger-
many. Specifically, the study analyzed how the surface area of wind 
parks, the maximum height of turbines, the influence on biodiversity (i. 
e., the hawk population), the shortest distance to inhabited areas and the 
monthly addition to the electricity tariff affected the acceptability of 
wind power. Using a spatial CE survey, Meyerhoff (2013) examined how 
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the respondents’ experience of turbines, e.g., the distance from a 
dwelling place to the nearest turbine, affected the propensity to support 
wind power generation. Furthermore, the welfare effects were also 
measured using a willingness to pay (WTP) measure. Bartczak et al. 
(2018) examined whether preferences for avoiding externalities from 
wind energy development near places of residence are influenced by 
personal beliefs about the negative effects of wind energy production in 
Poland. Using an approach based on the willingness to accept compen-
sation (WTA), Dimitropoulos and Kontoleon (2009) carried out a CE 
study to examine the factors affecting local acceptance of wind power in 
the Aegean Islands, Greece. Finally, Drechsler et al. (2011) constructed a 
model for optimizing the regional distribution of wind turbines, taking 
into account the social benefits and costs of wind energy production 
with the help of a CE survey of residents in West Saxony, Germany. 
If it were possible to reduce the negative local externalities, the 
acceptability of wind power might increase and the identification of 
locations for wind parks might become easier. A possible solution in the 
forested landscape, which is typical in Finland, may be to reduce the 
disturbing effects of wind turbines through forest management prac-
tices. This means that forest owners would avoid clear cuttings and use 
more cautious regeneration practices, i.e., continuous cover forestry or 
prolonged rotation, between residential areas and wind turbines. The 
aim would be that the standing trees would hide the turbines and stop 
them from spoiling the scenery. Here, we refer to these forest stands as 
landscape shields. If forest owners were willing to refrain from cutting 
mature forests between residences and the turbines, the harmful effects 
of the turbines could be alleviated or at best completely avoided. 
In recent years, the use of economic incentives for landowners, such 
as payments for ecosystem services (PES), has been presumed to help in 
environmental protection or the production of environmental benefits. 
Typically, in the implementation of these types of mechanisms, land-
owners make voluntary fixed-term contracts with a public authority or 
some other organization and receive monetary compensation for the 
protection or production of environmental benefits (Smith et al., 2013). 
In most cases, the funds for the compensation come from public sources 
(Mäntymaa et al., 2009; Gadaud and Rambonilaza, 2010). However, 
previous literature indicates that in some cases, private funding can 
additionally lead to landscape improvements (e.g., Tyrväinen et al., 
2014). Some studies have also analyzed the acceptance of and condi-
tions for the participation of private forest owners in relation to the 
mechanism of providing landscape or recreational values for compen-
sation, i.e., Landscape Value Trade (LVT) (Gadaud and Rambonilaza, 
2010; Mäntymaa et al., 2018b; Tyrväinen et al., 2020). 
The application of PES to counter the negative externalities of wind 
power using landscape shields in an LVT initiative is new but not 
straightforward. In the case of wind power, forest owners would be paid 
for the maintenance of landscape shields if they postponed cutting the 
forest at economically optimal points of time and suffered monetary 
losses as a consequence. From the social point of view, postponing forest 
cutting is rational, as mature forest provides the majority of landscape 
ecosystem services (ES) (e.g., Gundersen and Frivold, 2008; Ribe, 2009). 
With the payments, the landscape benefits of local residents and people 
who use the area for recreation and the economic losses of forest owners 
should be balanced. If the forest owners’ income losses are compensated 
for, then their attitude towards the provision of the landscape ES should 
be favorable. Of course, the case could also be that the compensation 
demanded by forest owners is higher than the benefits perceived by 
citizens. In this case, the program would not be feasible or worth 
implementing. Nevertheless, information is needed on the interest of 
landowners in taking part, as well as on their compensation requests. As 
far as we know, this theme has not been analyzed before. Thus, to ease 
the implementation of wind power plans, there is a clear need to 
investigate the determinants of participation in LVT, as well as the 
compensation requirements of forest owners. 
Using survey data, we investigate the interest of landowners in 
providing a landscape shield. We study the mechanisms that would 
encourage forest owners to manage their forests near wind farms so that 
their harmful or disturbing effects could be minimized. Specifically, we 
examine whether forest owners are willing to reduce the negative effects 
by using a new mechanism termed Landscape Value Trade (LVT). In 
addition, we identify the background variables that affect the re-
spondents’ interest in participating in LVT initiatives, in particular the 
role of socio-demographic and attitudinal variables. Finally, we analyze 
the amount of financial compensation that landowners are likely to 
claim for being ready to manage their forests to minimize the harmful 
effects of wind turbines. The focus of this study is on producing a general 
feasibility evaluation for the planning of the mechanism at the regional 
level. We do not aim to go to the forest stand level, where the detailed 
planning and negotiation regarding the practical application of LVT 
would take place if the mechanism is found generally feasible. 
2. Previous literature: landowner participation in PES 
Scientific knowledge on the willingness of landowners to participate 
in ecosystem service provisioning is crucial when designing PES mech-
anisms. It helps to target those owner groups who are more willing to 
participate in such policies (e.g., Ross-Davis and Broussard, 2007). Un-
derstanding the factors underlying willingness is essential for the 
reasonable design and implementation of mechanisms and further 
tailoring of consulting and information services for landowners (Boon 
et al., 2004; Maybery et al., 2005; Kendra and Hull, 2005). 
We assume that the choice of landowners to participate in a program 
that provides non-market ES takes place in two phases. First, the land-
owners make a general decision as to whether they are interested in 
participating in the program. They will decide to participate if their 
expectations for the utility gained from the land are higher with 
participation than without participation. Second, the landowners 
consider a compensation request that guarantees the utility level to be 
higher after participation in the program. If the landowners also benefit 
from the non-market ES that they provide, the compensation request 
may be lower than the economic loss from the management practices 
they have given up (Mäntymaa et al., 2009). 
Previous landowner studies have indicated the empirical variables 
that associate with participation in providing ecosystem services and 
with the demand for compensation. Landowner characteristics, such as 
socio-demographics, values, attitudes and beliefs, the economic aspects 
of a holding as well as its other characteristics, have been shown to affect 
the willingness to offer environmental services (e.g., Knowler and 
Bradshaw, 2007; Grammatikopoulou et al., 2012). Socio-demographic 
characteristics, such as age (Wynn et al., 2001; Vanslembrouck et al., 
2002; Langpap, 2004), educational background (Vanslembrouck et al., 
2002), and on-farm as well as off-farm income (Wossink and van 
Wenum, 2003; Loftus and Kraft, 2003; Zbinden and Lee, 2005; Defran-
cesco et al., 2008), have predicted landowner behavior relatively well. 
Of the property characteristics, the size of the holding has proven to be 
an important determinant of participation (Vanslembrouck et al., 2002; 
Lynch and Lovell, 2003; Zbinden and Lee, 2005; Defrancesco et al., 
2008). Geographical factors (Wossink and van Wenum, 2003; Lynch and 
Lovell, 2003; Jongeneel et al., 2008) have indicated that interest in 
participation may be spatially heterogeneous. 
Valuation studies have provided information on the compensation 
requests of landowners following ES provision. Such studies have indi-
cated that the compensation requests relate to the current management 
practices, the attributes of the new scheme, and landowner character-
istics, knowledge, and perceptions (e.g., Ruto and Garrod, 2009; Espi-
nosa-Goded et al., 2010; Christensen et al., 2011; Broch and Vedel, 
2012; Vedel et al., 2015b; Villanueva et al., 2017). Broch and Vedel 
(2012) demonstrated that a compensation request is associated with the 
relevant ES, while the WTA of landowners is lower when the aim is to 
protect biodiversity or groundwater compared to opportunities for rec-
reation. Several studies have shown (Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010; Aslam 
et al., 2017) that regardless of the offer of compensation, a considerable 
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group of landowners prefer to remain in a status quo state, showing an 
aversion to changing their present management practices. One reason 
for this may originate from the attitudes of many forest owners towards 
all forms of protection that have been found to be negative (Bergseng 
and Vatn, 2009; Nordlund and Westin, 2011). In addition, the trans-
action costs may decrease the interest of forest owners in participating. 
Moreover, this may be an indication of status quo bias, i.e., the tendency 
to choose an alternative reflecting the current situation, which is well 
known in the stated preference literature (Bonnichsen and Ladenburg, 
2015; Kahneman et al., 1991). Furthermore, previous studies have 
revealed the challenges in using a WTA measure in valuation, specif-
ically the disparity between WTP and WTA (Horowitz and McConnell, 
2002; Tunçel and Hammitt, 2014), as well as low incentives to reveal 
true preferences, i.e., a low incentive compatibility. 
Beyond the landowner, holding, and environmental characteristics, 
which are easily observable, previous literature has highlighted the 
strong role of values, attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions in the back-
ground of conservation and management decisions (e.g., Vanslem-
brouck et al., 2002; van Putten et al., 2011; Grammatikopoulou et al., 
2012; Defrancesco et al., 2008), the importance of production objec-
tives, or the intrinsic and social values of owning land (Emtage and 
Herbohn, 2012; de Young, 2000), in addition to bonds with the land 
(Ryan et al., 2003). The owners of small-scale forests are a heteroge-
neous group with a wide range of objectives and values that affect their 
decisions regarding conservation and land management (Karppinen, 
1998; Kline et al., 2000; Bolkesjø et al., 2007; Butler et al., 2007; Finley 
et al., 2006; Ingemarson et al., 2006; Becker et al., 2013). Previous 
studies have revealed perceived trade-offs between producing timber 
and non-market services such as maintaining the landscape and recre-
ation opportunities (Gordon et al., 2010; MEA, 2003; Power, 2010; 
Rodríguez et al., 2006). 
Previous forest owner studies concerning the willingness to produce 
amenity values via PES schemes have especially focused on the con-
servation of biodiversity (e.g., Horne, 2006; Mäntymaa et al., 2009; 
Boon et al., 2010; Lindhjem and Mitani, 2012; Vedel et al., 2015a, 
2015b). There has been much less research on the willingness of forest 
owners to provide scenic and leisure values in PES schemes (Ovaskainen 
et al., 2014; Gadaud and Rambonilaza, 2010; Mäntymaa et al., 2018a; 
Tyrväinen et al., 2020). Ovaskainen et al. (2014) observed heterogeneity 
in forest owners’ preferences towards ecosystem services. Many forest 
owners already provide some of these services spontaneously on their 
holdings, bearing the loss of income from timber sales themselves. They 
may benefit from the produced ES so much that the benefits compensate 
for the loss in timber sales. If, instead, they were to make a formal 
contract on the provision of these services for a fixed time period within 
a mechanism, LVT for example, they would lose not only income but also 
a part of their self-determination, which would imply a need for addi-
tional compensation. Depending on the magnitude of the perceived 
benefits and the self-determination cost, WTA may be under or over the 
loss in timber. Gadaud and Rambonilaza (2010) valued the compensa-
tion requests of forest owners for providing open access to nature-based 
recreational activities on private lands, and they introduced indicators 
of the fire risk as a factor affecting the financial compensation re-
quirements of forest owners. Mäntymaa et al. (2018a) found that more 
restrictive guidelines regarding forest management practices reduced 
the interest in participating and increased forest owners’ compensation 
requests in the proposed landscape value trading scheme. According to 
Tyrväinen et al. (2020), the largest marginal compensation requests 
were related to an extensive contract length and strict “no cutting” 
restrictions. 
Compared to holding characteristics or socio-demographic variables, 
previous studies have demonstrated the relative importance of attitu-
dinal factors in explaining the participation of land owners in PES 
schemes (Grammatikopoulou et al., 2012). Their interest in partici-
pating in a PES initiative can be interpreted as a behavioral intention 
following the attitude-behavior model presented by Ajzen and Fishbein 
(1980), in which actual behavior is preceded by behavioral intentions. 
In the causal sequence, a behavioral intention is a composite of attitudes 
towards a specific behavior. Attitudes towards an object are a composite 
of more detailed beliefs. The target of attitudes that significantly influ-
ence participation in a voluntary environmental scheme has been found 
to be quite broad (e.g., Grammatikopoulou et al., 2012). The probability 
of participation has been significantly and positively associated with 
attitudes towards the environment (Vanslembrouck et al., 2002; Lang-
pap, 2004), the perceived environmental benefits, and their state with 
and without a program (Söderqvist, 2003; Mäntymaa et al., 2009). 
Additionally, policies concerning current management practices and the 
perceived threat of regulation of landowner activities have been found 
to influence the decision to participate in PES schemes (Langpap, 2004). 
Attitudinal factors that concern environmental governance have also 
been considered as elements in the participation decision (Defrancesco 
et al., 2008; Wauters et al., 2010). In addition, participation may be 
driven by attitudes towards the voluntary scheme itself, beliefs con-
cerning its design and its implementation (Mäntymaa et al., 2009; Moon 
and Cocklin, 2011), as well as beliefs concerning the benefits to be ob-
tained with the scheme and the perceived difficulty of applying it 
(Defrancesco et al., 2008; Wauters et al., 2010; Moon and Cocklin, 2011; 
Reimer et al., 2012). 
This study contributes to the literature by applying the concept of 
PES to forest landscape services. Our application is novel, as it aims to 
reduce the harmful effects of other land uses, i.e. wind power. We show 
the strong role of attitudes in forest owners’ interest in participating in 
the suggested mechanism. We group the attitudinal factors into five 
categories while analyzing their effect on participation: 1) beliefs about 
the environmental good (landscape) and 2) about changes in the land-
scape due to wind power, 3) beliefs concerning the current governance 
of wind power externalities and 4) the governance of landscape issues in 
general, and 5) beliefs related to the introduced scheme, i.e., the LVT 
mechanism. 
We are interested in the relative importance of the two following 
types of variables: first, the characteristics of the landowner or their 
holdings, and second, attitudinal variables. This is because their roles in 
explaining participation have very different policy implications. If the 
landowner and holding characteristics are more important in explaining 
participation, the role of consultation and information services will be to 
find the right type of landowners. If attitudes based on information- 
driven factors are emphasized in participation decisions, the role of 
consultation and information services will be to target the beliefs behind 
the attitudes while providing information and designing counselling 
campaigns directed towards landowners. 
3. Case study area, materials and methods 
3.1. Case study area: two counties in southwestern Finland 
The case study area of this research comprises two counties, i.e., 
Varsinais-Suomi and Satakunta (Fig. 1), in southwestern Finland, where 
the wind power industry will be rapidly developed in the coming years 
(Huttunen, 2017). The regional land use plan presents an inventory of 
areas that are feasible for the development of wind power parks 
(Regional Council of Southwest Finland, 2011). The Regional Council of 
Southwest Finland chose to designate 20 larger areas for wind power 
parks allowing 10 or more turbines and 13 smaller parks with 6–9 tur-
bines, located either inland or on the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia. For 
wind power parks that are important on a county level, the Regional 
Council of Satakunta has designated 17 important areas comprising a 
target area of 128 km2. The designated areas, mostly located in sparsely 
populated, but not uninhabited, rural regions, will allow more than 300 
wind turbines to be constructed with a total electric power output of 3.1 
terawatt-hours (Regional Council of Satakunta, 2014). In the Finnish 
land use legislation, defining an area in a regional land use plan is a 
precondition for starting the detailed planning and building of a wind 
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power park (Land Use and Building Act 132/1999, 1999). Municipalities 
have the right to decide on detailed land use planning in their areas. 
After the master plans have been prepared, private energy companies 
are responsible for the permit processes and other practical aspects of 
building the wind turbines. 
3.2. Questionnaire, data collection, and sample representativeness 
Data on interest among landowners in producing a landscape shield 
and participating in an LVT initiative to reduce the landscape distur-
bance caused by wind turbines were collected via an Internet survey. 
The questionnaire of the survey had four sections. The first section 
inquired about the respondents’ perceptions concerning the different 
types of changes in the landscape, their attitudes towards wind turbines 
and their impacts, as well as the respondents’ attitudes towards 
compensation for the externalities of wind turbines. In addition, the 
section included a map (Fig. 1) presenting the locations of current 
operating and planned future wind power parks. The zoomable map 
increased the spatial explicitness of the survey by allowing respondents 
to locate their homes, forest holdings, and summer cottages in relation to 
the wind power parks. 
The second section briefly described the idea of a landscape shield. 
Respondents were told that the harmful effects of wind turbines could be 
reduced with the certain types of forest management practices. This 
would mean that, between residential areas and wind turbines, forest 
owners would avoid clear-cutting or would use lighter management 
practices, e.g. continuous cover silviculture. In this way, narrow belts of 
forests would remain and hide the wind turbines. After this information, 
the section constructed a scenario for a claim for compensation. The 
respondents were asked to imagine a hypothetical situation in which a 
wind power park was planned to be built in the neighborhood of their 
forest parcel near other people’s homes or vacation homes. Then, the 
respondents were asked their opinions about the functionality of a 
landscape shield to reduce the harmful effects of wind turbines and to 
preserve the benefits of ES. Furthermore, the section asked the re-
spondents about their own interest in providing a shield and their 
perception of other forest owners’ interest in providing a shield. In these 
questions, respondents were asked to imagine that a possible landscape 
shield could prevent a wind turbine from being visible from local homes 
or vacation homes. The aim was that the scenario would be applicable to 
all the respondents, allowing them to imagine a hypothetical situation in 
which their own standing forest belt would hide a turbine. There was 
also a question about their interest in discussing forest management 
related to a landscape shield with neighboring residents. 
The section described a hypothetical possibility of making a contract 
to provide a landscape shield for a limited period of time and asked for 
the lowest possible amount of annual compensation per hectare re-
spondents would accept for this type of agreement. The question 
regarding compensation asked whether the respondent had indicated 
interest in providing a shield or not. Here, we reminded the respondents 
Fig. 1. Case study area: the counties of Satakunta and Varsinais-Suomi. Legend: red points = existing wind parks, green points = planned wind parks. (For 
interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
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that overly large compensation claims may prevent a contract from 
being agreed. A payment card contingent valuation method was used to 
determine a value for the compensation. The respondents were pre-
sented a list of incremental monetary amounts and asked to indicate the 
lowest amount of their compensation requirement. The bid vector was 
€0, €5, €7, €10, €15, €20, €25, €35, €50, €75, €100, €140, €200, €300, 
€400, €550, €750, €1000, and more than €1000 per year per hectare; 
that is, the predicated WTA was revealed in 18 interval classes. Before 
the main survey, we conducted a pilot survey which demonstrated that 
the bid vector worked well. The section also included measures of atti-
tudes towards governance on landscape issues in general and towards 
the introduced LVT mechanism. 
The third section asked about details related to forest ownership 
including the total forest area owned, the amount of final felling over the 
previous few years, the amount of mature forest and the forest area a 
respondent would possibly be willing to provide as a landscape shield. 
Finally, the fourth section asked for some background features of the 
respondents. 
The survey was directed at private non-industrial forest owners in 
the counties of Varsinais-Suomi and Satakunta, in southwestern Finland. 
We received the names and e-mail addresses of possible survey re-
spondents from the Register of Forest Owners managed by Suomen 
Metsäkeskus (the Finnish Forest Centre). The number of private non- 
industrial forest owners owning forest in the case study area was 7200 
persons. Most of the forest owners lived in the region. The sample of the 
study was a total sample, i.e., we sent the questionnaire to all forest 
owners in the area. After testing the questionnaire with a pilot survey of 
100 respondents in January 2019, we conducted the main survey of 
7100 respondents in February 2019. The practical data collection was 
organized by a commercial survey company, Taloustutkimus Oy, and 
the survey was conducted online by sending out a call and an internet 
link to the survey in e-mail messages. After two reminders, we received 
1165 responses meaning a response rate of 16.4%. 
We evaluated the representativeness of our data in relation to the 
data from the same area in the national survey of forest owners con-
ducted by Hänninen et al. (2011) (Table 1). In our data, the respondents 
were slightly more often male, but concerning their age, we only found 
differences in the two oldest age groups. The lower level of participation 
in our study may reflect the fact that older generations less often respond 
to online surveys than younger ones. On the other hand, the distribu-
tions of the types of living environment, i.e. countryside or a city, were 
statistically equal in the two studies (chi-squared test of consistence, p =
0.996). The fact that the surface area of forest holdings was more 
extensive in our study than in that by Hänninen et al. (2011), specifically 
48.4 ha vs. 30 ha, respectively, appears to show that in the present study 
the PES scheme was more often interesting for those who owned above- 
average acreages of forested land (compare this to Mäntymaa et al., 
2018a). These differences indicate that those owners who were more 
concerned than average about the connection between forestry and 
wind turbines may be over-represented in our data. 
3.3. Econometric models and variables 
The first task of the study was to explain the respondents’ interest in 
participating in LVT. As the interest was measured with a three-step 
scale, where 0 = no, 1 = maybe, and 2 = yes, we analyzed the depen-
dent variable (INTEREST) with an ordered probit model. The corre-
sponding distribution of the variable was 26.4%, 44.1%, and 29.5%, 
respectively. Analyzing more carefully those who were not interested in 
participation in LVT, we constructed a binary probit model in which 
those who responded “no” (26.4%) were compared to the rest of the 
respondents (73.6%) (NOINTEREST). 
The second task was to ask the respondents about possible 
compensation claims. As we used a payment card as an elicitation 
technique, the survey did not provide exact monetary amounts but 
ranges within which the WTAs are located. Table 2 presents the distri-
bution of WTAs across the bid vector. To explain WTA, i.e., the smallest 
annual monetary compensation per hectare for providing a landscape 
shield in the LVT scheme for 5 or 10 years, we constructed a grouped 
data model. In the analysis, the monetary amounts larger than €1000 
were deleted from the data as outliers, because the amounts were 
probably unrealistically large for a practical implementation of the 
mechanism.1 Computed from the category centers of the bid vector of 
the payment card, the annual mean WTA was €297.6 per hectare (std 
dev. €248.8/ha/year, median class €200.01–300/ha/year) (Table 4). 
For those who responded “zero” or “don’t know” to the question 
related to compensation, we requested a rationale for the response with 
a follow-up question. Overall, the number of such responses was low, i.e. 
only 41 (Table 3). The actual number of respondents was even lower, as 
the answers were overlapping, with 17 respondents of 1381 giving these 
answers, meaning only 1.23% of all respondents. The rationale that “My 
forest is not suitable for a landscape shield”, for example, was only 
chosen by three respondents (0.22%). These results suggest that protest 
responses or outliers were not a serious problem in this survey. 
The potential socio-demographic and forest holding variables for the 
Table 1 
Socio-demographic features of the respondents in the counties of Satakunta and 
Varsinais-Suomi in the wind turbine study and in the same area in a national 
study by Hänninen et al. (2011).    
Satakunta and 
Varsinais-Suomi in 




Sample sizeb  1381  
Gender (%) Female 21.4 24 
Male 78.6 76 
Age (years, %) Below 45 16.0 15 
45–54 22.3 18 
55–64 29.8 31 
65–74 26.2 21 
75 or above 5.7 14 
Mean 57.6 59 
Type of living 
environment 
(%) 




Area of forest 
holding (%) 
Below 10 21.0 32 
10–19.9 18.5 28 
20–49.9 31.3 27 




Acreage of forest 
holding (ha) 
Mean 48.4 30  
a Source: Hänninen et al. (2011). 
b The number of observations varies between questions. 
Table 2 
Distribution of compensation claims across the bid vector (n = 1381).  
WTA, €/year/ha % WTA, €/year/ha % 
0 1.2 75.01–100 13.6 
0.01–5 0.2 100.01–140 3.6 
5.01–7 0.1 140.01–200 13.1 
7.01–10 0.7 200.01–300 13.6 
10.01–15 0.1 300.01–400 10.2 
15.01–20 0.4 400.01–550 9.0 
20.01–25 1.2 550.01–750 3.9 
25.01–35 0.4 750.01–1000 8.5 
35.01–50 3.7 More than 1000 14.9 
50.01–75 1.6    
1 The number of deleted observations of WTA above €1000 was 205. We 
conducted a sensitivity analysis with and without the deleted observations and 
found that the models changed only marginally but they fitted the data much 
better without these observations. 
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models were selected based on a literature review. For the independent 
variables of the participation models and the compensation claim 
models, we selected 10 socio-economic variables, which are presented in 
Table 4. 
To analyze the role of the attitudinal variables and the landowner 
and holding characteristics in the participation decision, we modelled 
the decision on participation and the WTA in two types of models.2 As 
regressors in the first models, we used socio-economic and forest holding 
variables, and in the second type, socio-economic and holding variables 
together with attitudinal variables. While we received the socio- 
economic variables more or less straightforwardly from the original 
data set, the construction of the attitudinal variables was slightly more 
complex. In the questionnaire, we measured five attitudinal concepts 
with beliefs about the following: 1) landscape changes with a list of 10 
items focused on the landscape effects of diverse economic activities, 
mostly in rural areas (Table A.1 in Appendix); 2) wind power with 17 
statements related to local disadvantages and local, national, or global 
advantages of wind turbines and wind power (Table A.2); 3) the 
governance of wind power externalities with 9 statements (Table A.3); 
4) governance concerning landscape issues with 11 different statements 
(Table A.4); and 5) the LVT mechanism with 7 statements (Table A.5). 
The respondents were requested to evaluate the statements on a five- 
step Likert scale from very negative to very positive in the first set of 
statements and from strongly disagree to strongly agree in the four latter 
sets. 
We used principal component analysis (PCA) to analyze whether the 
statements in these five sets measured unified concepts that could be 
combined in the same variable (e.g., Afifi and Clark, 1996). We based 
the explanation of the PCA results on the statements that had the highest 
loadings on each component (see Tables A.1–A.5). Based on the PCA, we 
selected statements that measured the same dimension. 
From the principal components of Tables A.1–A.5, we found 11 
statistically significant variables concerning respondents’ attitudes and 
perceptions. From the first PCA, which included beliefs about landscape 
changes in general, we found three significant variables, i.e., “Economic 
development in rural areas” (ECONDEV), “Decline of rural areas” 
(DECLINE), and “Land or soil use in rural areas” (LANDUSE) (Table A.1). 
In the second PCA, including beliefs related to the advantages and 
disadvantages of wind power, two significant variables were detected, 
namely “Local disadvantages of wind turbines” (WPDISAD) and “Ad-
vantages of wind power” WPADVAN (Table A.2). Table A.3 presents the 
results of the PCA related to the governance of wind turbines’ exter-
nalities, where we found one significant variable, “Public compensation 
for the landscape externalities of wind power” (PUBCOMP). The fourth 
PCA condensed information on statements regarding the governance of 
landscape issues and produced three significant variables for the anal-
ysis (Table A.4). We named them “Mistrust in land use planning” 
(MISTRUST), “Freedom of entrepreneurship” (ENTREP), and “Recrea-
tional-ecological compensation” (RECOMP). The final analysis related 
to attitudes towards the LVT mechanism produced two variables: “In-
terest in cooperation and LRV” (COOPER) and “Takes landscape values 
into account in forest management” (MANAGE) (Table A.5). As a basis 
for the regressors, we did not directly use the loadings of PCA. Instead, 
we calculated the variables using the original Likert scale assessments of 
the attitudinal statements and computed an average value of the as-
sessments included in each principal component. Thus, the observations 
of attitudinal variables are average values combining the original as-
sessments of each respondent with several statements selected with the 
help of PCA. The statistically significant independent variables used in 
the second regression analyses explaining the respondents’ interest in 
participating in LVT schemes and explaining compensation claims for 
providing a landscape shield are summarized in Table 4. 
We also tested whether the total forest area owned by a respondent 
or several other socio-demographic characteristics, such as age, main 
living environment (town or city, or rural area), household structure, or 
the respondent’s personal income, could explain the interest in partici-
pation or the compensation claims. However, we did not find a signifi-
cant relationship, and neither did we find that attitudes related to 
private compensation for landscape externalities of wind turbines or 
attitudes towards and experiences of participation in local land use 
planning could significantly explain the dependent variables. Conse-
quently, we left these regressors out of the models. 
4. Results 
4.1. Interest in participation in LVT 
Table 5 shows how the socio-economic variables in the ordered 
probit model explained the forest owners’ interest in leaving a forest 
patch as a landscape shield, i.e., their interest in participating in an LVT 
scheme (INTEREST). Interest increased if other family members than the 
husband or wife or the responsible person in a co-ownership arrange-
ment made forest management decisions (OMEMBER), or if the re-
spondent’s level of education was higher (EDUC). On the other hand, 
interest decreased if the area of commercial cutting in the respondent’s 
forest during the previous five years increased (CUTTING) or if the re-
spondent’s occupation was in agriculture or forestry (AGRIFOR). A very 
significant and positive coefficient for a constant term indicates that the 
participation interest without regressors was positive. A very significant 
coefficient for a threshold parameter suggests that the categories of the 
dependent variable should not be combined into one, i.e., the use of the 
ordered probit model was justifiable instead of a binary model, for 
example. 
Table 6 presents an extended model in which in addition to socio- 
economic variables, attitudinal variables also explain forest owners’ 
interest in participating in LVT. Due to mutual correlations, bringing 
attitudinal variables into the model also changed the significance of 
some of the socio-economic variables. With respect to the socio- 
economic variables, if a respondent her/himself made forestry de-
cisions (MYSELF), if a family member other than the husband or wife or 
the responsible person in a co-ownership arrangement made forest 
management decisions (OMEMBER), if the respondent was male 
(GENDER), or if the respondent was working instead of being retired or 
unemployed (WORKING), the more often she or he was interested in 
Table 3 
Rationale for “zero” or “don’t know” response for a compensation claim related 
to a possible landscape shield in the respondents’ forest (n = 1391).  
Rationale for a “zero” or “don’t know” response for a compensation 
claim 
Abs. % 
My forest is not suitable for a landscape shield. 3 0.22 
I would probably not cut my forest anyway. 7 0.51 
It is an obligation of wind power companies to minimize landscape 
effects. 
1 0.07 
In the landscape, wind turbines do not disturb me. 6 0.43 
I would offer a landscape shield without compensation. 7 0.51 
I do not believe that a landscape shield would work. 4 0.29 
Despite compensation, I do not want any restrictions on the 
management of my forests. 
3 0.22 
I do not believe that landowners would gain any compensation for a 
landscape shield. 
2 0.14 
I have not received enough information. 1 0.07 
Other problems are more important. 2 0.14 
I do not believe that it would be possible to make an agreement for a 
landscape shield. 
3 0.22 
Do not know. 2 0.14 
All rationales 41 2.97  
2 We also considered using a sample selection model with a two-phase esti-
mation method suggested by Heckman (1979) (Mäntymaa et al., 2009; 
Mäntymaa et al., 2018a). However, the first step of the model uses a binary 
dependent variable. Thus, in this study with a three-step dependent variable, 
we would lose the information for respondents with “maybe” answers. 
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participation. Concerning attitudinal variables, the more positively the 
respondents perceived economic development in rural areas (ECON-
DEV), or possibilities to receive public compensation (PUBCOMP) or 
recreational-ecological compensation (RECOMP) for the landscape ex-
ternalities of wind power, or the more often they independently took 
landscape values into account in their forest management decisions 
(MANAGE), the more likely they were to be interested in participation. 
In contrast, the more positively they perceived the land or soil use in 
rural areas (LANDUSE) or the freedom of entrepreneurship (ENTREP), 
or the more often they identified local disadvantages of wind turbines 
(WPDISAD), the less likely they were to be interested in participation. 
The highly significant estimate of the threshold parameter justified the 
use of the ordered probit model. 
A comparison of the two models of participation interest shows that 
the value of the log-likelihood function and the McFadden Pseudo R2 
both increased, from − 1329.228 to − 1161.266 and from 0.0168 to 
0.1623, respectively, and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
decreased from 2670.5 (AIC/n = 2.114) to 2348.5 (AIC/n = 1.821) if we 
added the attitudinal variables into the analysis. Thus, the goodness of 
fit of the latter model with the attitudinal variables is considerably 
Table 4 
Description and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis.  
Variable Description Mean Std 
dev. 
Dependent variables 
INTEREST Forest owner’s interest in participating in LVT; ordinal variable: 0 = no (26.4%), 1 = maybe (44.1%), 2 = yes (29.5%). 1.03 0.747 
NOINTEREST Forest owner’s interest in participating in LVT; binary variable: 0 = maybe or yes (73.6%). 1 = no (26.4%). 0.26 0.441 
WTA Forest owners’ stated compensation request within an LVT for 5 (10) years; disclosure technique: payment card; bid vector: €0, €5, €7, €10, 
€15, €20, €25, €35, €50, €75, €100, €140, €200, €300, €400, €550, €750, €1000/year/ha. WTAs are coded into 1, 2, …, 18 categories; the first 
category (zero WTAs) equals the interval y* < 1; the second category (€5): 1 ≤ y* < 5; the third category (€7): 7 ≤ y* < 10 and so on; the 18th 
category: 750 ≤ y* < 1000. 
297.6a 248.8a 
Socio-economic independent variables   
Characteristics of the forest holding 
MATURE Area of mature forest in the respondent’s holding (ha) 10.09 19.742 
MYSELF Respondent him/herself makes forestry decisions; binary variable: 0 = no (40.3%), 1 = yes (59.7%) 0.60 0.491 
OMEMBER A family member other than the husband or wife or the responsible person in co-ownership makes forest management decisions; binary 
variable: 0 = no (84.9%), 1 = yes (15.1%) 
0.15 0.359 
Financial characteristics of the respondents 
CUTTING Area of commercial cutting in one’s forest in the last 5 years; ordinal variable: 1 = 0 ha (36.8%), 2 = 0–1 ha (8.8%), 3 = 1–5 ha (36.0%), 4 =
5–10 ha (12.7%), 5 = 10–20 ha (3.4%), 6 = 20–30 ha (1.3%), 7 = more than 30 ha (0.8%) 
2.72 1.779 
METSO Respondent voluntarily restricted cutting in his/her forest within the METSO program; binary variable: 0 = no (93.3%), 1 = yes (6.7%) 0.07 0.251 
Socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents 
GENDER Respondent’s gender; binary variable: 0 = female (21.4%), 1 = male (78.6%) 0.79 0.410 
EDUC Level of education; ordinal variable: 1 = primary school (5.9%), 2 = vocational school (19.6%), 3 = high school (5.0%), 4 = polytechnic 
(41.2%), 5 = university (28.2%) 
3.66 1.241 
WORKING Respondent working; binary variable: 0 = no (34.0%), 1 = yes (66.0%) 0.66 0.474 
AGRIFOR Occupation in agriculture or forestry; binary variable: 0 = no (78.4%), 1 = yes (21.6%) 0.22 0.412 
ENVPRO Occupation in environmental protection or related areas; binary variable: 0 = no (97.0%), 1 = yes (3.0%) 0.03 0.170 
Attitudinal independent variablesb 
Landscape changes 
ECONDEV Economic development in rural areasc (C1.1e) 3.43 0.622 
DECLINE Decline of rural areas (C1.2e) 1.68 0.637 
LANDUSE Land or soil use in rural areasc (C1.3e) 3.10 0.806 
Wind power 
WPDISAD Local disadvantages of wind turbinesd (C2.1e) 3.00 1.051 
WPADVAN Advantages of wind powerd (C2.2e) 3.50 0.966 
Governance of wind turbines’ externalities 
PUBCOMP Public compensation for the landscape externalities of wind powerd (C3.2e) 2.83 1.078 
Governance in landscape issues 
MISTRUST Mistrust in land use planningd (C4.1e) 3.62 0.815 
ENTREP Freedom of entrepreneurshipd (C4.2e) 3.73 0.886 
RECOMP Recreational-ecological compensationd (C4.3e) 2.38 0.991 
LVT mechanism 
COOPER Interest in cooperation and LVTd (C5.1e) 3.07 1.110 
MANAGE Takes landscape values into account in forest managementd (C5.2e) 3.32 0.815  
a Computed from the category centers of the bid vector of the payment card. 
b Average value variables for the statements included in each principal component. 
c Originally calculated from observations of 5-step Likert scale, 1 = very negative … 5 = very positive. 
d Originally calculated from observations of 5-step Likert scale, 1 = strongly disagree … 5 = strongly agree. 
e Refers to the interpretation of principal components shown in Tables A.1–A.5 in the Appendix. 
Table 5 
Ordered probit model of socio-economic variables explaining the interest of 
forest owners in leaving a forest patch as a landscape shield.  
Independent variable Coefficient Std Error z p 
Constant *****0.73918 0.11769 6.28 0.0000 
OMEMBER ***0.23837 0.09079 2.63 0.087 
CUTTING ***− 0.09087 0.02422 − 3.75 0.0002 
EDUC *0.04825 0.02562 1.88 0.0596 
AGRIFOR ***− 0.24537 0.07789 − 3.15 0.0016 
Threshold parameter ***1.20727 0.04277 28.23 0.0000 
Fit statistics 
Log likelihood function − 1329.228    
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.0168    
Inf. cr. AIC 2670.5    
AIC/n 2.114    
n 1263     
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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better. 
Combining socio-economic and attitudinal variables in a probit 
model, Table 7 analyzes more carefully those who were not interested in 
participation in LVT, i.e. those who responded “no” to the interest 
question compared to the rest of the respondents (NOINTEREST). In the 
model, the plus sign of the coefficient means that the increase or the 
realization of the variable increased the probability of not being inter-
ested in participation, and vice versa. Thus, related to socio-economic 
variables, the positive and significant sign for CUTTING means that 
the larger the area where forest owners had conducted commercial final 
felling during the previous 5 years, the more likely they were to not be 
interested. On the other hand, the probability of not being interested in 
participation decreased if a family member other than the husband or 
wife or the responsible person in a co-ownership arrangement made 
forest management decisions (OMEMBER), and if a respondent was 
working instead of being retired or unemployed (WORKING). Related to 
attitudinal variables, the more positively they perceived the land or soil 
use in rural areas (LANDUSE) or the freedom of entrepreneurship 
(ENTREP), the more likely they were to not be interested in participa-
tion. In contrast, the more negatively the respondents perceived 
economic development in rural areas (ECONDEV) or the local, national, 
or global advantages of wind power (WPADVAN), or the more worried 
they were about the decline of rural areas (DECLINE), the less likely they 
were to answer “no” to the question concerning interest. 
4.2. Compensation claims for participation in LVT 
Table 8 reports how forest owner’s interest in participating in LVT 
(“no”, “maybe”, or “yes”) affected the monetary compensation request 
for leaving a forest patch as a landscape shield. The results indicate that 
the greater was the interest in participating, the less forest owners 
claimed in compensation. The independent samples t-test (equal vari-
ances not assumed) for the pairwise comparison of the first two means (t 
= 5.181, p = 0.000) and the last two means (t = 3.619, p = 0.000), as 
well as the first and last means (t = 7.499, p = 0.000) showed that the 
mean WTAs significantly differed between the forest owners in different 
groups of interest. 
In Table 9, with a grouped data model, we present the socio- 
economic variables that explain forest owners’ possible WTA for 
participation in LVT, i.e., the smallest annual monetary compensation 
per hectare they would accept for providing a landscape shield. We 
found that an increase in the area of commercial cutting in the re-
spondent’s forest (CUTTING) or having an occupation in agriculture or 
forestry (AGRIFOR) increased the compensation claim. The WTA tended 
to decrease if the level of education of the respondent was higher 
(EDUC) or if the respondent’s occupation was in environmental pro-
tection or related areas (ENVPRO). 
Table 10 shows the combined model of socio-economic and attitu-
dinal variables that explain forest owners’ potential WTA. With respect 
to socio-economic variables, the larger the area of mature forest in the 
respondent’s holding (MATURE), or the more often a respondent had 
voluntarily restricted cutting in her/his forest within the METSO pro-
gram3 (METSO), or the more often a respondent worked (WORKING), 
the larger the WTA was. In contrast, having an occupation in 
Table 7 
Ordered probit model of socio-economic and attitudinal variables explaining the 
lack of interest of forest owners in leaving a forest patch as a landscape shield.  
Independent variable Coefficient Std Error z p 
Constant *0.63851 0.37157 1.72 0.0857 
CUTTING *0.06004 0.03329 1.80 0.0713 
OMEMBER **− 0.32103 0.13263 − 2.42 0.0155 
WORKING ***− 0.24624 0.09094 − 2.71 0.0068 
ECONDEV ***− 0.25377 0.07280 − 3.49 0.0005 
DECLINE *− 0.12643 0.07046 − 1.79 0.0728 
LANDUSE ***0.25748 0.06741 3.82 0.0001 
WPADVAN ***− 0.57657 0.04391 − 13.13 0.0000 
ENTREP ***0.24513 0.05624 4.36 0.0000 
Fit statistics 
Log likelihood function − 591.887    
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.2029    
Inf. cr. AIC 1201.8    
AIC/n 0.920    
n 1306     
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. 
Table 8 
Interest of forest owners in participating in LVT and WTA compensation for 
leaving a forest patch as a landscape shield.  
Interest Mean WTA Std dev. n 
No 407.4 289.2 222 
Maybe 294.2 238.7 563 
Yes 240.4 216.3 392 
Total 297.6 248.8 1177  
Table 9 
Grouped data regression model of socio-economic variables explaining forest 
owners’ WTA compensation for leaving a forest patch as a landscape shield.  
Independent variable Coefficient Std Error z p 
Constant ***225.377 18.97441 11.88 0.0000 
CUTTING ***15.9082 3.99353 3.98 0.0001 
EDUC **− 10.4422 4.21215 − 2.48 0.0132 
AGRIFOR *20.7768 11.59918 1.79 0.0733 
ENVPRO **− 60.8641 30.15006 − 2.02 0.0435 
Disturbance standard deviation ***157.395 3.82922 41.10 0.0000 
Fit statistics 
Log likelihood function − 2383.01852    
Inf. cr. AIC 4778.0    
AIC/N 4.8451    
n 985     
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. 
Table 6 
Ordered probit model of socio-economic and attitudinal variables explaining the 
interest of forest owners in leaving a forest patch as a landscape shield.  
Independent variable Coefficient Std. Error z p 
Constant ***0.24306 0.32788 3.79 0.0001 
MYSELF *0.12239 0.07149 1.71 0.0869 
OMEMBER *0.16652 0.09614 1.73 0.0833 
GENDER **0.17221 0.08569 2.01 0.0445 
WORKING ***0.24365 0.07071 3.45 0.0006 
ECONDEV ***0.15199 0.05873 2.59 0.0097 
LANDUSE ***− 0.29760 0.05351 − 5.56 0.0000 
WPDISAD ***− 0.36357 0.03540 − 10.27 0.0000 
PUBCOMP ***0.13488 0.03446 3.91 0.0010 
MANAGE ***0.23614 0.04334 5.45 0.0000 
ENTREP ***− 0.27993 0.04341 − 6.45 0.0000 
RECOMP ***0.21359 0.03886 5.50 0.0000 
Threshold parameter ***1.44783 0.05200 27.84 0.0000 
Fit statistics 
Log likelihood function − 1161.266    
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.1623    
Inf. cr. AIC 2348.5    
AIC/n 1.821    
n 1290     
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. 
3 METSO is a voluntary-based program for preserving biodiversity in pri-
vately owned forests in Finland (Gustafsson, 2008; Mäntymaa et al., 2009). 
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environmental protection or other related areas (ENVPRO) tended to 
reduce the respondent’s WTA. 
Regarding attitudinal variables, the lower the trust in the system of 
land use planning (MISTRUST), or the more positive the attitude to-
wards the freedom of entrepreneurship (ENTREP), the larger the claim 
was for possible compensation for participating in an LVT initiative. On 
the other hand, the more possible they perceived public compensation 
for the landscape externalities of wind power (PUBCOMP) to be, or the 
more interested they were in cooperation or LVT (COOPER), the smaller 
their WTA was. 
Additionally, adding the attitudinal variables into the analysis 
slightly reduced the goodness of fit of the WTA model, as the value of the 
log likelihood function decreased from − 2382.256 in the first model to 
− 2424.469 in the second model and the AIC increased from 4776.5 to 
4868.9. However, with respect to the number of observations, i.e., the 
AIC/n, the goodness of fit increased slightly with the figure decreasing 
from 4.849 to 4.806. 
5. Discussion 
We investigated the supply side of the LVT mechanism as an 
approach to preserve the provision of landscape values with forest 
management methods in areas around wind energy sites. Using a data 
set from an online survey and by means of models including either socio- 
economic regressors or socio-economic and attitudinal regressors, we 
analyzed both forest owners’ interest in participating in LVT schemes 
and their willingness to accept compensation for making a contract 
within an LVT. 
We found that only 29.5% of the respondents were expressly inter-
ested in participating in LVT initiatives, which is quite a small per-
centage. However, if we add the respondents who indicated that they 
would possibly participate, we end up with 73.6% of the forest owners 
who responded to the survey. When considering launching and imple-
menting a PES-type instrument, this is not a small share. In fact, given 
that LVT is a new mechanism and has not yet been implemented, the 
estimated rate of interest is surprisingly high. Additionally, this is true if 
compared to previous results regarding participation interest in forest- 
related PES (Mitani and Lindhjem, 2015; Markowski-Lindsay et al., 
2011; Mäntymaa et al., 2018a). One reason for the high rate of interest 
might be that landowners in the area are accustomed to a similar policy 
mechanism for biodiversity preservation, i.e., the METSO program, 
which was first tested in the county of Satakunta from 2003 to 2007 
(Juutinen et al., 2008; Mäntymaa et al., 2009). However, to turn the 
majority of the “maybe” responses into “yes” responses would require 
interaction, careful communication and deliberation on the features of 
the proposed instrument with the public (see e.g., Kurttila et al., 2019). 
The identification of willing candidates, drawing their attention and 
successful recruitment are the key features of effective implementation 
of a PES mechanism. The results indicate that the larger was the area 
that the forest owners had recently cut, the smaller was the probability 
that they would be interested in participation. It may be reasonable to 
assume that a large cut area increases the income earned from forestry 
and consequently the importance of forestry as a livelihood (Karppinen 
et al., 2020). Thus, the socio-economic variable reflecting the re-
spondents’ dependence on forest management and forest income in-
dicates a smaller tendency to become interested in participating in PES 
initiatives. Accordingly, the result indicates that owners earning a sub-
stantial share of their living from forestry and actively engaging in forest 
management are not the most likely segment to participate in LVT 
schemes. This may imply that LVT is perceived as a restriction on forest 
management rather than an alternative way to earn from the forest. This 
is in line with findings that the fear of tighter restrictions on forest 
management in the future tends to reduce the interest of forest owners in 
participating in voluntary protection measures (Karppinen et al., 2020; 
Lindhjem and Mitani, 2012; Mäntymaa et al., 2018a). 
Regarding the dependency, we found additional results: the more 
often the respondents’ occupation was in agriculture or forestry, the less 
likely they were to be interested in participation, and in contrast, the 
higher the educational level of owners was, the more likely they were to 
be interested. The latter makes sense if more highly educated people less 
often work in forest management or are less dependent on a forestry 
income. Previous studies (e.g., Meyer, 2015) have also shown that more 
educated forest owners tend to favor more nature conservation and may 
be more interested in landscape protection. An occupation in forestry 
also means that typical forest management practices are well known, but 
new types of forest management related to PES create uncertainty. 
Our results revealed that male respondents were more often ready to 
join the LVT initiative than the rest of the owners. This contradicts the 
findings from previous literature that females usually had stronger 
environmental concerns and more positive preferences towards envi-
ronmental protection than males (e.g., Xiao and McCright, 2015; 
Zelezny et al., 2000). Nevertheless, there are also research results indi-
cating that males are more willing than females to join and demand less 
compensation from PES programs seeking to enhance the preservation 
of forest biodiversity (Lindhjem and Mitani, 2012; Mitani and Lindhjem, 
2015). We also found that working respondents were more interested in 
joining LVT initiatives than others. It might be reasonable to consider 
that people working in a profession have more economic flexibility to try 
out new ideas than retirees and unemployed people with lower incomes. 
The interpretation of an additional result that having a positive attitude 
towards rural economic development increases the probability of being 
interested in LVT participation appears logical if the construction of 
wind turbines is regarded as part of the development. 
In this study, the average annual compensation request was about 
€298 per hectare. This is a relatively large sum of money compared with 
the materialized mean compensation paid (€176/ha/year) in the Finnish 
program for forest biodiversity conservation (METSO), in which cutting 
is disallowed throughout the duration of an agreement, which is usually 
10 years (Juutinen et al., 2008). The request is also higher than the 
annual operating profit of nonindustrial private forestry4 in Satakunta 
Table 10 
Grouped data regression model of socio-economic and attitudinal variables 
explaining forest owners’ WTA compensation for leaving a forest patch as a 
landscape shield.  
Independent variable Coefficient Std Error z p 
Constant **101.212 42.98412 2.35 0.0185 
MATURE **0.68576 0.34514 1.99 0.0469 
METSO **43.1374 19.98748 2.16 0.0309 
WORKING ***28.8005 10.48053 2.75 0.0060 
ENVPRO **− 57.8251 29.21791 − 1.98 0.0478 
PUBCOMP *− 9.32862 5.07027 − 1.84 0.0658 
COOPER ***− 24.7315 5.51857 − 4.48 0.0000 
MISTRUST ***23.0640 6.76923 3.41 0.0007 
ENTREP ***36.5290 5.77096 6.33 0.0000 
Disturbance standard deviation ***154.518 3.71737 41.57 0.0000 
Fit statistics 
Log likelihood function − 2424.469    
Inf. cr. AIC 4868.9    
AIC/N 4.806    
n 1013     
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. 
4 The operating profit in non-industrial private forestry is the difference be-
tween the earnings from and costs of non-industrial private forestry. This 
comprises gross stumpage earnings (calculated on the basis of the volume of 
felled industrial wood and energy wood, as well as wood felled for own use and 
standing sales prices) and state subsidies for wood production. Expenditure 
includes investments in private silviculture and forest improvement, as well as 
administrative costs and other expenses. (Luke, 2020.) 
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and Varsinais-Suomi, which fluctuated between €133 and €201 per 
hectare in 2015–2018 (Official Statistics of Finland, 2019). However, as 
Nape et al. (2003) deduced, individuals in reality seem to accept less 
money in compensation than in a hypothetical situation. Hence, the paid 
sums in real LVT initiatives are expected to be slightly smaller than those 
elicited here. 
Furthermore, in the METSO program for biodiversity conservation, 
forest owners were paid to provide ES for society at large. In LVT, on the 
other hand, forest owners provide ES for particular, probably identified 
and known fellow citizens. In eliciting compensation claims, forest 
owners were asked to keep their own property in mind. It seems that 
they consider the community good more valuable than the public good. 
The public good and beneficiaries are dispersed in society, while the 
community good provided by the landscape shield is concrete, and it 
benefits real people and fellow citizens close to the forest property. A 
landscape shield has real value, as it undeniably improves the living 
conditions of the target people. For this reason, a higher value is indi-
cated, paradoxically perhaps from a fellow community member point of 
view, in higher compensation claims than is the case for biodiversity and 
more abstract ES. This calls for further investigation into the moral as-
pects of property regimes in the face of emerging PES schemes. 
Related to the cost-effective implementation of a PES mechanism, 
identifying and recruiting those forest owners who would claim low 
amounts of compensation for the production of environmental services 
is an essential issue. Just as it was found above that low dependence on 
forestry and forest-related income tended to increase interest in partic-
ipation in LVT schemes, it also seemed to reduce the compensation 
claims. This is suggested by the negative coefficients of variables 
describing higher levels of education or having an occupation in envi-
ronmental protection. On the other hand, while reducing interest, the 
variables suggesting a higher dependence, i.e., an increase in the area of 
commercial cutting or having an occupation in agriculture or forestry, 
were associated with higher compensation claims. In addition, as in 
previous studies by Lindhjem and Mitani (2012) and Mäntymaa et al. 
(2009), we found a positive dependence between the increase in the area 
of mature forests owned and WTA. This is a natural result, as the op-
portunity cost increases as trees in a protected stand grow. Moreover, 
the result is important for developing LVT, because forests in an ideal 
landscape shield should be high and dense and the principal in LVT 
should be ready to pay a reasonable price for an effective shield. 
The analysis revealed a positive association between previous 
agreements on voluntary biodiversity preservation in METSO and the 
monetary amount of claims. A plausible explanation for this might be 
that based on the forest owners’ experience of the previous program, 
PES is a trustworthy and profitable way to earn money from forests by 
postponing a decision to cut down a parcel of forest for a contract period. 
This result shows that the previous experience has not become an ethical 
motivation, because the payment claim would be lower if the internal 
motivation had increased. What may have happened here is that this 
kind of economic incentive structure reinforces a particular type of 
economic thinking and rationale and perhaps also external, 
compensation-driven motivation; this is a known general characteristic 
of any workable institutional arrangement (cf., Hiedanpää and 
Borgström, 2014; Hiedanpää and Bromley, 2012; Satz and Forejohn, 
1994; North, 2005). 
Related to the cost-effective implementation of the mechanism, a 
noteworthy and important result is that the more interested the re-
spondents were in cooperation with an LVT initiative, the smaller the 
amount of compensation they would claim. Thus, the non-obligatory 
nature of LVT reduces the costs, as the more willing landowners 
engaged in the instrument will claim less compensation (Mäntymaa 
et al., 2018a). If the marketing of LVT schemes could find and recruit the 
most interested owners, it would also minimize the costs of landscape 
protection. 
Several attitudinal variables associated significantly with compen-
sation claims. An increasingly positive attitude towards the freedom of 
entrepreneurship, e.g., in forest management, tended to increase the 
compensation claims. This result is predictable, because the direct op-
portunity costs and financial losses increase with management re-
strictions. The result confirms previous findings that those owners who 
perceive preservation rules as too restrictive are less likely to participate 
(Mitani and Lindhjem, 2015; Mäntymaa et al., 2018a; Tyrväinen et al., 
2020; Vedel et al., 2015b). 
Regarding the perceptions of governance in landscape issues, we 
found that lower trust in the system of land use planning tended to in-
crease the compensation claims. This is in line with the results of Broch 
and Vedel (2012) and Vedel et al. (2015a), who found that a control 
instrument developed to minimize the abuse of the system, i.e., the 
monitoring of landowners’ behavior related to compliance with the 
mechanism, increased compensation level required by farmers. Land-
owners may be annoyed by monitoring and see it as an incursion into 
their private holding, considering monitoring as a signal of mistrust, for 
example (Vedel et al., 2015a). Low confidence in the LVT initiative as 
such may be a matter of risk, as distrust increases risks and risks may 
become costly. 
Finally, we found that the more often the respondents felt that public 
compensation for the landscape externalities of wind power was 
possible, the smaller the WTA was. This indicates that respondents’ 
increasing support for the idea of public compensation, i.e. that mu-
nicipalities could compensate for the disadvantages of wind power by 
developing non-environmental local services or by otherwise enhancing 
the quality of landscape, would reduce the compensation claimed. This 
may suggest that forest owners would be ready to substitute private 
monetary gains with social benefits, i.e., municipal services or other 
types of landscape quality. This is an interesting result, suggesting that 
private income (WTA) can be compensated for by municipality-supplied 
public goods. 
6. Conclusions 
The main findings of this study demonstrated that almost three- 
quarters of respondents were certainly or possibly interested in 
participating in LVT to minimize the harmful landscape effects of wind 
turbines. Related to the socio-economic characteristics of the land-
owners, a low dependence on forestry and forest-related income tended 
to increase interest in participation in LVT schemes, and vice versa. In 
addition, the compensation of the effects with municipal non- 
environmental services or other types of environmental benefits was 
inclined to increase the interest, whereas a positive attitude towards 
land or soil use or the freedom of entrepreneurship tended to decrease it. 
This study revealed that the annual mean compensation for preser-
ving one hectare as a landscape shield was about €300, tending to in-
crease if the probability of interest in participating decreased, and vice 
versa. The modeling of compensation claims demonstrated a compara-
ble message to participation interest: the socio-economic characteristics 
that indicate a high dependence on forestry and forest-related income 
tended to increase the compensation claim, and vice versa. With respect 
to attitudes, low trust in the land use planning system and a positive 
attitude towards entrepreneurial freedom inclined owners to increase 
their compensation claim, whereas the development of municipal non- 
environmental services and respondents’ increasing interest in cooper-
ation in landscape protection tended to decrease the claim. 
Knowledge of the interest of landowners in participating in LVT 
schemes and their willingness to accept compensation for making a 
contract within LVT is essential for policy makers to consider when 
planning and applying a new PES mechanism. To create a well- 
functioning policy instrument, it is necessary to evaluate the charac-
teristics of possible participants and the incentives that encourage forest 
owners to participate in LVT initiatives, or that discourage them. It is 
equally essential to evaluate the level of requests for monetary 
compensation and the factors influencing the claims. In particular, it is 
important to identify those landowners who are willing to accept a lower 
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level of compensation to effectively target and market LVT schemes. If 
the organizer of LVT knows the socio-economic characteristics and at-
titudes that increase or decrease the probability of participation with a 
reasonable level of compensation, this may enhance the process and 
improve the cost-effectiveness in the implementation of the mechanism. 
From a policy relevance point of view, our outcomes can assist in the 
recognition of some of the most significant features of the possible 
supply side of LVT. These features are crucial for the successful planning 
and application of an upcoming payment instrument to minimize the 
disturbing effects of wind turbines. However, attitudinal variables that 
did not help in identifying the possible providers of landscape shields 
had a considerable role in explaining the participation and compensa-
tion claims. The importance of attitudes in determining the landowners’ 
participation and compensation decisions highlights the significance of 
providing information to landowners. The attitudes and beliefs of those 
who are opposed to LVT need to be taken into account in planning 
counselling campaigns, as well as consulting and information services. 
These could provide evidence related to those beliefs that most strongly 
hinder participation. 
There are, however, some limitations in the interpretations and 
applicability of the present results. First of all, because the harmful ef-
fects of wind turbines and compensation claims are highly localized, the 
general results of this study only have limited direct use in planning 
local solutions. Local circumstances constrain the possibilities of forest 
management to minimize the effects. Thus, an important challenge for 
LVT initiatives is to negotiate and make contracts with those owners 
who possess forest stands in crucial sites. If deals are not reached and if 
the owners wish to cut the stands, landscape shields will be lost. 
Consequently, these owners have a kind of monopoly at that site and can 
claim relatively high compensation for agreements. Thus, the results of 
this study can serve as background information for organizing LVT 
locally. 
Second, the general regional scope of this study ignores the impor-
tance of the structure of a particular forest area and opportunity costs 
related to LVT. If a specific parcel that is crucial for a landscape shield is 
mature and ready for harvesting, the forest owner’s opportunity costs of 
joining the program would be relatively large. As we are not, however, 
dealing with the total protection of large areas but the delaying of cut-
ting of narrow belts of forests for a fixed period, the compensation need 
not be excessive. Alternatively, if forest owners have just clear-cut a 
parcel and planted new trees, they would probably agree to participa-
tion and not require much compensation, since the actual opportunity 
costs would be very low. In this case, however, the young stand would 
not act as an effective landscape shield for some time and would not be 
interesting for a manager of LVT. Shedding light on these aspects would 
require more detailed data than were generated in this study, and would 
be an interesting topic for further research. In the practical application 
of LVT in a local case, however, the structure of the forest and the op-
portunity cost of delaying a cut is essential information and should be 
taken into account when making a contract and defining the level of 
compensation. 
Third, related to the plausibility and trustworthiness of the results, 
we cannot rule out the possibility of hypothetical bias, as the survey was 
based on a hypothetical situation. In non-market valuation, the bias 
may, however, be a more serious problem in cases focusing on non-use 
or existence values. Here, we assessed quite concrete use values that 
relate to market-based goods, i.e., future timber revenues or recreational 
and landscape values, which may not be so sensitive to the hypothetical 
nature of the valued good (Foster and Burrows, 2017). 
Finally, in addition to the supply side, information related to the 
demand for the landscape shield is also essential. The public discussion 
and official complaints from residents indicate the landscape harm 
caused by wind turbines, which provides a reason to develop the idea of 
LVT schemes further. In addition to minimizing the costs of LVT, it is 
also necessary to maximize the net benefits of the mechanism. Knowl-
edge of the demand is needed to ensure this. The question is whether 
residents are interested in participating in the PES mechanism. If they 
are, we should know the terms and conditions of their participation and, 
furthermore, their willingness to pay for minimizing the landscape ef-
fects of wind turbines. These questions are among the topics that should 
be analyzed in the future. 
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Appendix A. Appendix  
Table A.1 
Principal components based on perceptional statements on landscape changes (Oblimin rotation with Kaiser normalization. Loadings of 0.50 or above in boldface).   
Principal components 
C1.1 C1.2 C1.3 
Expansion of built-up areas. 0.830 0.005 − 0.132 
Construction of traffic routes. 0.697 − 0.003 0.095 
Expansion of commercial centers. 0.679 0.203 0.051 
Business activities using the landscape, e.g., construction of buildings for the tourism business or private holiday living. 0.594 − 0.169 0.131 
Construction of new buildings in rural areas. 0.507 − 0.433 0.048 
Abandonment of villages or buildings in a poor state of repair. − 0.019 0.845 0.126 
Decline of farming or abandonment of fields. 0.064 0.790 − 0.164 
Forest cuttings or intensive site preparations. 0.015 − 0.002 0.827 
Intensive agriculture. − 0.081 − 0.132 0.816 
Soil removal. 0.129 0.147 0.721 
Eigenvalue (rotation sum) 30.235 10.493 10.274 
Cumulative variance explained, % 32.350 47.275 60.015 
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Note: Interpretation of principal components: 
C1.1 Economic development in rural areas. 
C1.2 Decline of rural areas. 
C1.3 Land or soil use in rural areas.  
Table A.2 
Principal components based on attitudinal statements related to the advantages and disadvantages of wind turbines 
(Oblimin rotation with Kaiser normalization. Loadings of 0.50 or above in boldface).   
Principal components 
C2.1 C2.2 
Wind turbines disturb birds and other animals. 0.921 0.106 
Wind turbines cause disturbing noise. 0.877 0.034 
Wind turbines may have harmful effects on people’s health. 0.871 0.092 
Wind turbines may destroy the image of a region. 0.829 − 0.066 
Wind turbines decrease the value of land. 0.816 − 0.032 
Wind turbines destroy the scenery. 0.813 − 0.095 
Wind turbines reduce possibilities to hunt. 0.791 − 0.028 
Wind turbines make farming and forestry substantially more difficult. 0.755 − 0.076 
Wind turbines reduce possibilities to take outdoor exercise. 0.745 − 0.122 
Wind turbines restrain climate change. 0.072 0.911 
Wind turbines are an example of the technology of the future. − 0.016 0.896 
Wind turbines are a good source of domestic energy. − 0.059 0.869 
Wind turbines are essential for future energy production. − 0.076 0.853 
Future generations will benefit from the development of wind energy. − 0.034 0.849 
Wind energy is clean. 0.008 0.824 
Wind turbines help people to be orientated in wild areas. 0.020 0.547 
Wind turbines strengthen the uniqueness of a region. − 0.356 0.403 
Eigenvalue (rotation sum) 10.209 1.585 
Cumulative variance explained, % 60.05 69.38 
Note: Interpretation of principal components: 
C2.1 Local disadvantages of wind turbines. 
C2.2 Advantages of wind power.  
Table A.3 
Principal components based on attitudinal statements related to compensation for the externalities of wind turbines (Oblimin rotation with Kaiser normalization. 
Loadings of 0.50 or above in boldface).   
Principal components 
C3.1 C3.2 
Wind turbines cause so few disadvantages that they do not need compensation. 0.846 0.168 
It is wrong to grant licenses for wind power parks, as those suffering from the disadvantages are not compensated. ¡0.821 − 0.170 
It is a good practice not to provide compensation for the disadvantages of wind power. 0.818 0.031 
All sufferers from the disadvantages of wind turbines should be compensated. ¡0.776 − 0.015 
Wind turbines should be allowed to be built more freely. 0.757 0.243 
Wind turbines should be designed to fit the local conditions. ¡0.558 0.267 
Wind power should only be subsidized if the disadvantages are compensated for. ¡0.511 0.364 
Municipalities could compensate for the disadvantages of wind power by developing other local services. 0.037 0.845 
The disadvantages of wind power could be compensated for by otherwise increasing the quality of the landscape. 0.164 0.823 
Eigenvalue (rotation sum) 3.928 1.642 
Cumulative variance explained, % 43.642 61.884 
Note: Interpretation of principal components: 
C3.1 Compensation for the landscape externalities of wind turbines. 
C3.2 Public compensation for the landscape externalities of wind power.  
Table A.4 
Principal components based on attitudinal statements related to perceptions of the governance of landscape issues (Oblimin rotation with Kaiser normalization. 
Loadings of 0.50 or above in boldface).   
Principal components 
C4.1 C4.2 C4.3 C4.4 
Companies causing changes in the landscape should always compensate those suffering from the disadvantages. 0.791 0.008 0.001 0.129 
The sufferers of landscape-related disadvantages should always be heard. 0.768 − 0.161 0.031 0.133 
Projects that change the landscape obtain permits for their realization too easily. 0.750 − 0.058 − 0.092 − 0.025 
Changes in the landscape often come as a surprise. 0.685 0.134 0.032 − 0.231 
At present, the rights of landowners are too restricted. 0.040 0.863 − 0.041 0.080 
Statutes related to the environment have restricted the possibilities for entrepreneurship too much. − 0.086 0.806 0.153 − 0.024 
Landowners should have the right to use their forests as they wish. − 0.001 0.779 − 0.105 0.019 
A change in the landscape could be compensated for with a protected area somewhere else. 0.062 − 0.006 0.901 0.009 
A change in the landscape could be compensated for with a new recreational service, e.g., an outdoor recreational route, somewhere else. − 0.052 − 0.003 0.880 0.006 
(continued on next page) 
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Table A.4 (continued )  
Principal components 
C4.1 C4.2 C4.3 C4.4 
I am aware of different projects changing the landscape. − 0.143 − 0.013 0.044 0.805 
If possible, I always participate in the preparation of regional plans in my neighborhood. 0.159 0.096 − 0.030 0.754 
Eigenvalue (rotation sum) 2.632 2.007 1.436 1.273 
Cumulative variance explained, % 23.930 42.178 55.233 66.806 
Note: Interpretation of principal components: 
C4.1 Mistrust in land use planning. 
C4.2 Freedom of entrepreneurship. 
C4.3 Recreational-ecological compensation. 
C4.4 Participation in local land use planning.  
Table A.5 
Principal components based on attitudinal statements related to interest in the LVT mechanism and forest management practices (Oblimin rotation with Kaiser 
normalization. Loadings of 0.50 or above in boldface).   
Principal components 
C5.1 C5.2 
I would be interested in providing a landscape shield if I received monetary compensation. 0.902 0.029 
I am interested in discussing the provision of a landscape shield. 0.894 0.118 
I am interested in discussing my forest management practices to reduce the harmful landscape effects of wind power. 0.862 0.176 
I am willing to lease a part of my land to wind power companies for building wind turbines. 0.786 − 0.225 
I take into account the needs of my neighbors in my forest management. 0.084 0.857 
I wish to hear the views of my neighbors when I plan my forest management. 0.177 0.750 
I always take into account conditions related to the landscape in my forest management. − 0.149 0.664 
Eigenvalue (rotation sum) 3.275 1.653 
Cumulative variance explained, % 46.792 70.400 
Note: Interpretation of principal components: 
C5.1 Interest in cooperation and LVT. 
C5.2 Takes landscape values into account in forest management. 
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